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DEFERENCE TO AUTHORITY AS A BASIS FOR MANAGING
IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT
ToM TYLER AND MARGARITA KROCHIK*
I. BACKGROUND
When we examine political or legal institutions, one key criterion
of their effectiveness is their ability to manage problems or disagree-
ment within the communities over which they exercise authority. This
is equally true of political institutions, such as the United States Con-
gress, and legal authorities, like the United States Supreme Court. Each
struggles with gaining public support for its authority to make deci-
sions within a particular arena, as well as with gaining public support
for particular policies.
Ideally, authorities are able to manage disagreements by changing
people's understanding of the facts underlying some value-based poli-
cy. For example, an institution might lead people to believe that climate
change is real, and because of that changed belief motivate people to
change their attitudes and values and, as a result, their policy positions.
Trying to change beliefs, values and attitudes are difficult objectives
because prior beliefs, attitudes and values shape people's understand-
ing of new information, assimilating it into prior frameworks and re-
jecting information that is too discrepant. As a consequence, people are
most likely to be receptive to information that supports their prior
understanding of the facts, as well as their prior attitudes and values.
Social-science research supports the argument that belief, attitude and
value change is difficult, especially when people view the world
through value-based frameworks as fundamentally different as those
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discussed by Dan Kahan.1 As he notes, in value-centered arenas, such
as climate change, people often respond to information inconsistent
with their prior attitudes and values by disparaging the source and the
message.2
The idea of reaching a consensus about important public policy is-
sues is central to models of deliberative democracy.3 That work sug-
gests that groups can rationally discuss issues and reach some
common view about facts and valueS.4 It is unclear, however, whether
such consensus is actually possible when highly contentious issues,
such a climate change, are involved. It is further unclear whether con-
sensus is a desirable normative goal. In pluralistic societies the under-
lying assumption is that people differ in their values, and that such
diversity in values is part of a pluralistic democratic state. As a result,
the goal of governance should be to reach policy positions that are ac-
ceptable to a broad segment of the population, although not necessari-
ly consistent with people's personal values and policy preferences.
The problems associated with achieving fact and value consensus
raise the question of the degree to which it is necessary to have agree-
ment about facts and values for society to function effectively. This
issue is widely discussed in the context of multiculturalism,5 with
commentators opining that America cannot exist if commonly held
values are not widespread in the population. As Kahan shows, this
question has been extended into the modern era through discussions
of conflicts over value laden issues, like climate change, and in disputes
about the facts used by different factions to advance their value based
positions.6 The issue has been, and is today, a question of the degree to
which agreement about facts or consensus about values, or both, is
necessary for authorities to be effective in managing disputes.
The argument tested in this paper is that authorities can also
manage conflict in a different way. They can build their legitimacy as
appropriate societal authorities and through their legitmacyinfluence
people's view that they have an obligation to defer to the decisions of
1. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term-Forward: Neutral Principles, Motivat-
ed Cognition, and Some Problemsfor Constitutional Law, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1, 19-31 (2011).
2. See id. at 25.
3. See JUrgen Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, in 1 THE THEORY OF
cOMMUNICATIVE ACTIONS 3 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981).
4. JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC
CONSULTATION 194 (2009).
S. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY (1991).
6. See generally Kahan, supra note 1.
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duly constituted authorities.7 This legitimacy-based approach focuses
upon gaining deference, rather than changing people's understanding
of the factors or their attitudes and values. It is consistent with a long-
standing American tradition of deference to a private sphere in which
people can hold religious and moral values that differ, but with a
shared allegiance of deferring to political and legal authorities.
Successful leaders and institutions have a long history of striving
to build legitimacy and through it, to win the consent of the governed.
They do so with the goal that their commands will be voluntarily
obeyed by the public, even though the public does not necessarily
agree with them or view them as consistent with their private moral
values or preferred policies.8 As Herbert Kelman puts it: "It is essential
to the effective functioning of the nation-state that the basic tenets of
its ideology be widely accepted within the population .... This means
that the average citizen is prepared to meet the expectations of the
citizen role and to comply with the demands that the state makes upon
him, even when this requires considerable personal sacrifice."9 Legiti-
macy, according to this general view, is a quality that is possessed by
an authority, a law, or an institution that leads others to feel obligated
to accept its directives. It is, in other words, "a quality attributed to a
regime by a population."io The roots of the modern discussion of legit-
imacy are usually traced to the important writings of Max Weber on
authority and the social dynamics of authority.11
Weber argues that the ability to issue commands that will be
obeyed does not rest solely upon the possession and ability to use
power.12 In addition, there are rules that people will voluntary obey,
and authorities whose directives will be voluntarily followed. Legiti-
macy, therefore, is a quality possessed by an authority, a law, or an
institution that leads others to feel obligated to obey its decisions and
directives. This feeling of responsibility reflects a willingness to sus-
pend personal considerations of self-interest and to ignore personal
7. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57
ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 375 (2006).
8. ToM. R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-4 (2006).
9. Herbert C Kelman, Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social
Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 276,
278 (James N. Rosenau ed., 1969).
10. Richard M. Merelman, Learning and Legitimacy, 60 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 548 (1966).





moral values because a person thinks that an authority or a rule is enti-
tled to determine appropriate behavior within a given situation.
Kelman & Hamilton refer to legitimacy as "authorization" to re-
flect the idea that a person authorizes an authority to determine ap-
propriate behavior within some situation, and then feels obligated to
follow the directives or rules that authority establishes.13 As they indi-
cate, the authorization of actions by authorities "seem[s] to carry au-
tomatic justification for them. Behaviorally, authorization obviates the
necessity of making judgments or choices. Not only do normal moral
principles become inoperative, but-particularly when the actions are
explicitly ordered-a different type of morality, linked to the duty to
obey superior orders, tends to take over."14
One way to think about legitimacy is as a property of an institu-
tion. For example, studies of confidence in government ask people to
rate the overall government, and its institutions and authorities. Stud-
ies of the legitimacy of legal authorities similarly ask people to evaluate
their general feelings of responsibility and obligation to obey the law
and legal authorities. This focus on the importance of legitimacy re-
flects concern with the circumstances under which people follow the
directives of social rules and social authorities. Legitimacy is important
to the success of such authorities because it allows them to gain public
deference to a range of decisions by virtue of their social role. This
deference is not unlimited, since legitimacy may exist within a certain
sphere, but within that sphere, acceptance of the right of authorities to
make decisions that ought to be accepted and obeyed is broad.15
There is a considerable amount of research suggesting both that
legitimacy leads to deference in the face of disagreement and that this
mechanism is distinct from attitude or belief change. Consider one
example relevant to the topic of the United States Supreme Court. Tom
Tyler and Gregory Mitchell examined people's willingness to deter to
Rowe v. Wade.16 They found that there was considerable willingness to
defer to that decision, even among those who morally opposed abor-
tion.17 The key to such deference was viewing the Court as a legitimate
institution. On the other hand, Tyler and Mitchell found that legitimacy
13. See HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 77-78 (1989).
14. Id. at 16.
15. Tyler, supra note 7, at 385.
16. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 735-65 (1994).
17. Id. at 756-60.
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was distinct from value or belief change. People still felt that abortion
was morally wrong-their beliefs and values did not change. But, they
viewed deferring to the Court as their responsibility. Hence, legitimacy
is a potentially effective mechanism in the case of fundamental value
based disputes. From this perspective, legitimacy is a highly desirable
feature of social systems.1a
The legitimacy argument has advanced considerably in the last
decade, as it has been shown that there are ways to build and maintain
legitimacy that are distinct from providing people with decisions that
they want or agree with. Legitimacy can be built through procedural
fairness. Our suggestion is that authorities can gain a great deal of le-
gitimacy when they follow clear norms of procedural justice, including
impartiality, transparency, respect for human dignity, and considera-
tion of peoples' views, concerns, and needs. Thus, implementing fair
procedures, as well as providing favorable and/or fair outcomes, can
provide a solid basis for establishing system legitimacy.
The legitimacy of authorities is an especially promising basis for
the rule of law because noted research suggests that it is not yoked to
agreement with the decisions rendered by legal authorities. If people
view as legitimate only those authorities that make decisions they
agree with, it would be difficult for legal authorities to maintain their
legitimacy, insofar as they are required to make unpopular decisions
and to deliver unfavorable outcomes. In times of war, for example,
people must be willing to be drafted and serve in the armed forces. In
times of scarcity they must accept diminished economic outcomes. And
when contentious social issues are involved they may have to accept
policies that they disagree with or even feel are morally wrong.
The procedural basis of legitimacy is especially strong with re-
spect to public opinion concerning political and legal institutions. Stud-
ies of the Presidency19, the legislature2o, and the Supreme Court21 all
suggest that when citizens are evaluating government institutions,
18. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH
THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002).
19. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski & Kathleen M. McGraw, The Influence of
Perceived Injustice on Support for Political Authorities, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 700 (1985).
20. See generally Amy Gang), Procedural justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking
Process, 25 POL. BEHAV. 119 (2003); J.R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC
ENEMY: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995); J.R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH
THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK
(2002).
21. Mark D. Ramirez, Procedural Perceptions and Support for the US Supreme Court, 29 POL.
PSYCHOL. 675 (2008); Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 790.
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they focus primarily on the fairness of the procedures by which the
institutions make policies and implement decisions. Research on work
organizations also suggest that perceived legitimacy has a strong pro-
cedural basis.22
The procedural basis of legitimacy on an institutional level is con-
sistent with the argument that support for the rules of governance (i.e.,
procedures and institutions) is theoretically and empirically distin-
guishable from support for particular individuals or their policies.
Studies suggest that reactions to individual leaders and policies are
more strongly linked to outcome desirability than are reactions to in-
stitutionS.23 In general, however, it is support for the rules of govern-
mental operation-what Easton refers to as "diffuse system
support"24-that is seen as crucial to long-term governmental stability.
Our thesis is that the most reliable way of attaining legitimacy and
maintaining diffuse system support for legal institutions and authori-
ties is by establishing and protecting procedural safeguards. Indeed,
the need for procedural safeguards is one of the strongest arguments
for the Constitutional separation of executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government. To the extent that procedures for insuring
genuine fairness are compromised, the system will begin to lose legit-
imacy and-over time-fail to inspire the kind of cooperation and def-
erence that is often taken for granted during periods of stability.
The distinctness of decision-making procedures from their out-
comes, and the ability of people to recognize and respond to that dis-
tinction, is a basis for managing contentious public policy issues. What
is particularly striking about procedural justice judgments is that they
shape the reactions of those who are on the losing side of cases. If the
person who does not receive an outcome that they think is favorable or
fair feels that the outcome was arrived at in a fair way, they are more
likely to accept it. And, studies conducted over time show that people
continue to adhere to fairly arrived at decisions over time, suggesting
that their acceptance of those decisions is genuine and not simply the
22. Kimberly D. Elsbach, The Architecture of Legitimacy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY 391
(John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001); ToM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L.
Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct? The Antecedents ofRule Following in
Work Settings, 48 ACAD. OF MGMT. 1. 1143 (2005).
23. See Kenneth Rasinski, Tom R. Tyler & Kim Fridkin, Exploring the Function of Legitimacy:
Mediating Effects of Personal and Institutional Legitimacy on Leadership Endorsement and System
Support, 49 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 386-94 (1985).
24. DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 444 (1965).
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result of fear or coercion.25 Further, people who experience procedural
justice in court rate the courts and the court personnel more favorably,
indicating higher levels of trust and confidence in the courts and the
court system.
The key point about procedures is that they shift the focus from
the policies or outcomes at issue to the fairness of the procedure.
While it is often not possible to give everyone an outcome that is con-
sistent with their sense of what is appropriate, it is possible for every-
one to experience a fair procedure. This includes feeling that decisions
are being fairly made, believing that that their concerns are being re-
spected, and believing that their values are taken into account.26
II. THE MEANING OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
A great deal has been written about the meaning of fair proce-
dures to people who are evaluating legal or political authorities. The
broad procedural justice framework includes a set of issues that are
potentially important in evaluating the fairness of a procedure. These
include whether people have opportunities for input (voice); whether
decisions are made in a neutral and transparent way, through con-
sistent and fact-based rule application (neutrality); whether people
and their rights are respected (respect); and, whether authorities are
viewed as sincere and benevolently motivated when making decisions
(motive based trust).27
A recent study of public views about the United States Supreme
Court (hereafter USSC) was conducted by James Gibson and Gregory
Caldeira.28 They found little support for a mechanical jurisprudence
model in which justices were viewed as simply applying laws when
making decisions. Rather, people view the Court as acting with discre-
tion.29 The results of their survey indicated that the public's reactions
depend upon how such discretion is exercised.
The Gibson study distinguishes two images of discretion: one
based upon principles and sincerity and the other based upon the stra-
25. Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neal B. McGillicuddy, Gary L. Welton & Lynn M. Castrian-
no, Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 313, 313-30 (1993).
26. Tom R. Tyler & E. Ailan Lind, A Relational Model ofAuthority in Groups, in 25 Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology 115 (Mark P. Znna ed., 1992).
27. Steven Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four Component Model of Procedural justice: Defining the
Meaning of "Fair" Process, 29 PERSON. & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747-58 (2003).
28. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the




tegic expression of self-interest. The public's belief that justices are
acting upon principles and acting sincerely (being "judicious") is cen-
tral to their legitimacy. Gibson and Caldeira note that this is similar to
earlier findings about Congress, where studies suggested that the be-
lief that legislators act out of personal self-interest is key to the low
legitimacy of Congress.3o While this finding is provocative, it is unclear
from the discussion what acting sincerely means.
A second recent study is that of Dan Kahan.31 His analysis suggests
two ways that courts can communicate decisions so as to lessen threat
to cultural groups. These methods give a sense of what sincere means
to the public. He first suggests the idea of "aporia," a demonstration by
the Court that it gives fair and open-minded consideration to the ar-
guments presented by the various parties involved.32 The Court needs
to show that it carefully "scrutinized the record"33 by paying attention
to all sides of the argument. Second, Kahan suggests the idea of affir-
mation.34 He argues that the court needs to acknowledge the various
values underlying the positions articulated by different groups, show-
ing respect for the values they reflect. In other words, the Court needs
to display "idioms and gestures that display cultural plurality."35
Drawing upon these approaches, this paper compares three mod-
els of how decisions are understood by the public. Kahan focuses upon
what the justices should do, while this paper will focus on the other
side of the equation: what members of the public should feel about the
court in order to conclude that fair procedures have occurred, that
decisions are legitimate, and that they should defer to those decisions.
One way of thinking about what the public is concerned about is
the legal model in which decision makers make decisions, which are
consistent with legal principles. This idea is presented by Gibson and
Caldeira as the mechanical jurisprudence model of Court decision-
making.36
A second model involves the degree to which the Court considers
the needs and concerns of the people affected by a decision. To under-
stand this model, it is important to consider the focus of studies of
30. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE (1995), supra note 20; HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE (2002), supra
note 20.
31. See Kahan, supra note 1, at 58-71.
32. Id. at 59-66.
33. Id.at 67.
34. Id. at 67-71.
35. Id. at 71.
36. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 28, at 213-14.
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trust in government.37 People are typically asked whether political
leaders are too influenced by "special interests," such that they disre-
gard the needs of the people.38 The contrasting view is that leaders
make their decisions after considering the needs of the people in their
community. Finally, does the Court respect people's values? The alter-
native to respecting people's values is making decisions based upon
the justice's own ideology and political views.
While consideration of public concerns and making decisions con-
sistent with public values are both more directly linked to the connec-
tion between authorities and the community than making decisions
based upon the law, they are not the same. In particular, consideration
of public views is an issue of trust in authorities. People have no direct
way of observing whether their views are considered, so they make an
inference about the character of the decision maker-whether they are
concerned about public needs.39 In contrast, making a decision con-
sistent with public values is something that the public can directly
evaluate by comparing the decision to their values.
Trust is an element of discretion-a decision to infer that authori-
ties are exercising their authority in a benevolent and sincere way-
while a comparison of decisions made to public values reflects a view
that formal law does not necessarily reflect those values, so people
want to understand whether in fact their values are represented in the
actions of the authority. From the perspective of an authority, discre-
tion has more flexibility, so consideration is the most desirable way to
have one's actions judged.
A. Summary
Overall, two arguments are made and tested. The first is that legit-
imacy-conceptualized as the perception that decisions made fairly
are appropriate and the perceived obligation to defer to those deci-
sions-flows from procedural justice judgments, in addition to any
influences of their favorability or un-favorability. The second is that
people have a conception of procedural justice that extends beyond the
traditional focus of attention: whether justices correctly apply the law.
37. See Margaret Levis & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. OF POL.
Sci. 475,475-507 (2000).
38. Stephen J. Farnsworth, Congress and Citizen Discontent, 31 AM. POL. REs. 66, 68 (2003).




Respondents responded to hypothetical instances of decision
making by either the United States Supreme Court or the United States
Congress.40 In each case, the participant was presented with an issue of
self-identified high or low moral/economic significance. They were
asked to consider that a decision about that issue was made by one of
two decision-making bodies. That decision either favored or opposed
their previously stated position.
Before they were asked questions about a particular decision, re-
spondents were given a list of twenty-one issues and were asked to
identify important and unimportant issueS.41 These rankings were
used to identify issues of high and low importance to each respondent.
Such ratings were made for ethical/moral issues and for economic
issues.
The study had five factors that were varied randomly across the
respondents: (1) whether the issue was high/low in importance; (2)
whether the issue was moral or economic; (3) whether Congress or the
Supreme Court was the decision making authority; (4) whether the
questions about how the decision was made focused upon procedural
fairness or procedural unfairness; and (5) whether the decision was
favorable or unfavorable to their position.
Each participant was asked to consider a decision made by one of
the government institutions about an issue. They were first told that
the decision favored or opposed their own views and then asked to
rate how fairly they thought that decision was made. They were then
asked about their willingness to accept the decision.
C Sample
The sample consisted of 256 residents of the United States who
completed the study for compensation. The participants were recruit-
ed via Mechanical Turk and they completed the questionnaire on the
internet via Qualtrics.
40. While these two institutions may be evaluated in the same way, there are also sugges-
tions that they may be viewed differently. See Margit Tavits, Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts
and Political Competition, 51 AM. J. OF POL. SC 151, 151 (2007).
41. The listed issues were: the environment, health care, war, terrorism, torture, gay mar-
riage, national security, taxes, abortion, stem cell research, foreign trade, capital punishment,
prayer in schools, immigration policy, gun control, space exploration, affirmative action, interna-




Participants were asked to evaluate either the Supreme Court or
Congress. Participants were asked a set of questions which tested their
willingness to accept the decision they had read. These questions fo-
cused on two issues: (1) viewing the decision as appropriate, and (2)
expressing willingness to defer to it. These two judgments were used
to construct an overall acceptance scale.42 The following questions
were used to evaluate different outcome variables:
* Appropriateness. Two items were used: (1) "Was this a
fair decision?"; and (2) "Was this decision appropriate?".
* Acceptance. Four items were used: (1) "How willing
would you be to accept the results of this decision?"; (2)
"To what extent do you approve of this decision?"; (3)
"How willing would you be to comply with what was de-
cided?"; and (4) "How willing would you be to allow this
institution to make final decisions about policies in this
area?".
* Procedural justice judgments. Respondents were also
asked questions about different aspects of the fairness of
the procedure they thought the agency used.
* Principled decision-making. Respondents were asked if
the decision was "consistent with relevant regulations and
laws."
* Consideration of people's concerns. Respondents were
asked whether they believed that "citizen's concerns were
given adequate consideration in the decision."
* Respect for public values. Respondents were asked the
degree to which the decision "reflected the ethical values
of the public affected by it."




The study also measured education, income, and self-reported lib-
eralism. Within the sample, 44% of respondents had less than a B.A.;
38% had a B.A.; and 18% had advanced degrees. The sample's annual
family income levels were 22% under $25,000 annual family income,
34% with annual family income between $25,000 and $50,000, 35%
with annual family income $50,000 to $100,000, and 9% with annual
family income over $100,000. Finally, based upon their positions about
economic and social issues, 43% of the sample was classified as con-
servative and 57% as liberals based upon their positions about eco-
nomic and social issues.
III. FINDINGS
When people evaluated the fairness of the decision maker, they al-
ready knew that the decision made by the authority was opposed to or
in favor of their own position. Hence, any influences of the fairness of
the procedure were especially striking because respondents were
making them in the shadow of a decision that they already knew fa-
vored or opposed their own values. The design of the study was there-
fore stacked against finding procedural justice influences because the
outcome was already known. Normally, authorities try to place proce-
dures prior to the decision so that support for their legitimacy is creat-
ed through the fairness of the procedure, and that support then
cushions them against an unfavorable or undesired decision.
The first important question is whether the perceived procedural
justice of the procedure through which the respondents believed the
institution made the decision influenced their acceptance of that deci-
sion. The crucial point is that this study looks at the willingness to de-
fer to decisions, not beliefs or attitude changes. As noted, prior studies,
such as Tyler & Mitchell, examined the willingness to defer to decisions
made by the Supreme Court about abortion, finding considerable will-
ingness that flowed from the view that the Supreme Court made its
decisions using fair procedures.43 However, Tyler & Mitchell did not
find evidence of attitude change.
Regression analysis was used to examine the influence of proce-
dural justice judgmentS44 upon the willingness to defer. The results of
43. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 738.
44. Either principled, adequate consideration of concerns, or respect for values.
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that analysis are shown in Table 1. The numbers shown are beta
weights, which reflect the relative influence of each factor. Influences
that are significantly different than zero are starred.4s The overall ad-
justed square of the multiple correlation coefficient indicates how
much of the variance in willingness to defer is explained by all of the
factors in the equation considered at one time.
The results shown in Table 1 first indicate that, as expected, peo-
ple's willingness to accept decisions was shaped by their favorability
(beta = 0.35). In addition, a comparison of the two equations shown
indicated that the procedural justice elements explained additional
variance, raising the variance explained from 39% to 66%. Further,
each of the three procedural justice elements had a distinct influence.
The procedure was evaluated as being more fair if (a) judges were
viewed as principled followers of the law (beta = 0.12); (b) if judges
were seen as giving adequate consideration to citizen needs and con-
cerns (beta = 0.35); and, (c) if judges were judged to make decisions
which were consistent with public values (beta = 0.18).
The results also suggest that the experimental variations had little
direct influence upon the respondent's judgments. Further, variations
in education, income, and conservatism had only a minor influence.
The two effects found were a lesser willingness to accept decisions
made by Congress and a tendency for the better educated to be more
willing to defer to political and legal authorities.
These findings support the argument that deference is more
strongly linked to procedures than it is to outcomes.46 Hence, they
support the suggestion that political and legal institutions can encour-
age deference through their actions. By making decisions in ways that
the public views as fair, the Court can enhance its legitimacy.
On the other hand, these findings point to a different image of
which procedural elements are important than is reflected in past dis-
cussions of the importance of neutrality and rule following.47 It is im-
portant for the Court to make decisions in ways that follow the law.
However, it is also important that the public views the justices as giv-
ing adequate consideration to their concerns and as making decisions
that reflect public values.
45. *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001.
46. To illustrate this point, if outcomes are not considered, but procedures are, 56% of the
variance in deference is explained. On the other hand, column one shows that only 39% of the
variance is explained when only outcomes are considered.
47. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 773-78.
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These latter findings point to the need for the Court to address
public concerns in reporting its decisions. Kahan's discussion of the
Court emphasizes the need for the justices to indicate that they have
considered public concerns and to demonstrate a respect for public
valueS.48 That argument is very much consistent with the findings re-
ported here, which focus on what the public needs to feel about the
Court. If the justices address the concerns noted by Kahan, they are
more likely to create the impressions this study finds are linked to
public views that they are acting via procedural justice.
In thinking about this argument, it is important to contrast it to a
view focused upon whether the justices are following the law. If a con-
cern about public support leads to changes that focus upon issues such
as transparency, then changes will be based upon the assumption that
the public simply needs to know more about what the Court is doing,
i.e. needs more openness. These findings suggest that this is a mis-
placed emphasis. While openness is important, it is more important to
focus on what the Court is being open about.
What does the public want to know? First, consider the view that
distrust is linked to the belief that authorities do not consider the
views, needs, and concerns of average people, which underlie discus-
sions of trust in government.49 To counter this view, decisions need to
make clear that public concerns were considered by explaining how
the decision was made. It is not enough to open up the process by be-
ing transparent, the process needs to be explained with reference to
the way that decision makers were attentive to the concerns of the
public.
Similarly, the belief that authorities act based upon their own ide-
ologies and political preferences must be addressed by providing evi-
dence about how public values were engaged during the decision
making process. Kahan notes that decisions might affirm the im-
portance of the various public values at issue when making decisions.5o
In other words, the justices should account for their decisions in ways
that show appreciation for, and consideration of, public ethical con-
cerns. The key is not simply to be transparent-so that people can see
how decisions are being made-but to account for decisions in ways
that address public concerns.
48. Kahan, supra note 1, at 59-66.
49. In public opinion polls, this openness is often contrasted to paying too much attention to
special interests or big corporations.
50. Kahan, supra note 1, at 59-66.
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It is also important to ask whether the background of the current
justices is related to the nature of the opinions they write. Currently,
the Court is composed of people with a background as judges. Hence, a
focus on disputes over principles of law is natural. However, a broader
conception of the role of the Court could include a greater effort to
articulate the way in which the public's needs, concerns and values are
being considered during Court decision-making. This is a more natural
focus for people whose background includes involvement in politics, as
is true of the members of Congress. However, these findings support
the value of such an expanded view of the purpose of the Court's deci-
sions.
A. Does Winning Matter?
The respondents evaluated the Supreme Court/Congress after
they were told to imagine that the institution had opposed or favored
their own position on the issue under consideration. Did the nature of
the outcome matter? To address this question the analysis shown in
Table 1 was replicated separately for those in the favorable and unfa-
vorable outcome conditions. That analysis is shown in Table 2. It indi-
cated that those respondents who were reacting to favorable decisions
focused more heavily upon their inferences about whether their views
were considered. When outcomes were unfavorable, respondents were
concerned about both whether their concerns were considered and
whether the decisions were consistent with their values.
B. What is the Range of Proceduraljustice Influences?
To examine the range of procedural justice influences the re-
spondents were divided into groups based upon whether or not the
issue they considered was moral or economic and was an issue of high
or low self-rated importance. The results of the regression analyses
among these subgroups are shown in Table 3. They indicated that re-
spondents always focused upon procedural justice issues. However,
the particular issues they were concerned about changed, depending
upon the issue. In the case of moral issues, high importance led to more
attention to procedural justice issues, with both consideration of views
and respect for values becoming important. With economic issues, high
importance led to greater attention toward outcome favorability. How-




C An Era of Mistrust?
Finally, it has been noted that there is a strong current of institu-
tional distrust within America today, at least as far as national level
institutions are concerned. For example, recent Gallup polls indicate
that 66% of Americans expressed "a great deal/fair amount" of trust in
the Supreme Court in 1973, and 67% in 2012.51 During the same peri-
od, trust in Congress went from 70% to 31%, and trust in the executive
branch of government from 73% to 56%.52
In this study, the respondents indicated less willingness to accept
and defer to decisions made by Congress, consistent with its generally
lower trust and confidence ratings.53 And, of course, respondents were
less willing to accept and defer to unfavorable decisions.54 The re-
spondents were particularly unwilling to defer to unfavorable deci-
sions made by Congress.ss
To examine the influence of distrust on deference, an analysis was
conducted separating the Supreme Court from Congress. This analysis
also separated the justice from the injustice frame in the questions. As
has been noted, this study framed procedural justice as fairness or
unfairness. So, for example, people were asked whether decision-
making would have a "presence of neutrality/lack of bias" or a "lack of
neutrality/presence of bias."56 The fairness frame encourages a focus
upon the presence of fairness, and the unfairness frame upon the ab-
sence of fairness. This allows Congress, a less trusted institution, to be
considered separately; combining this focus with a focus on the issue
of whether the institution acted unfairly maximized the ability to focus
on low trust conditions.
Table 4 presents the results of the analysis outlined. It indicates
that respondents evaluating the Supreme Court consistently focused
upon whether or not they trusted the Court to consider their concerns.
In contrast, when Congress was the focus of evaluation and questions
were framed in terms of injustice, people focused upon more directly
observable issues-whether Congress followed the law and whether




53. Wilks' Lambda = 0.96; p <.01.
54. Wilks' Lambda = 0.62; p <.001.
55. Interaction Wilks' Lambda = 0.97, p < .05.
56. These variations in question framing are drawn from the survey protocol.
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its decisions reflected the public's values. These findings reinforce the
previously made suggestion that having greater legitimacy allows dis-
cretionary actions based upon trust that people's needs are being ade-
quately considered. With lower legitimacy comes less ability to act
with discretion, since the public is reacting more strongly to the corre-
spondence between laws, public values and the decisions made.
D. The Value of Discretionary Authority
As Kahan and others have noted, it is difficult to change people's
beliefs, attitudes and values. Hence, to the extent that the ability of
legal and political authorities to be effective depends upon their ability
to achieve such change, that is potentially problematic. On the other
hand, people can defer to authorities without agreeing with them,
something that provides an alternative basis for authority in pluralistic
societies with divisive political and social differences. This study sup-
ports earlier findings that people defer to decisions, at least in part, for
procedural reasons, rather than simply because they agree with those
decisions.57 Hence, authorities can gain the ability to exercise their
authority by making decisions in ways that people experience as being
fair.
These findings further support the argument that people have a
broader conception of fairness than is reflected in early discussions of
procedural justice. The focus of early studies was upon decision-
making.sa Comparatively, the findings reported here suggest that peo-
ple focus on not only whether decisions are made in neutral ways that
reflect the law, but also on the role that public concerns play in deci-
sion-making. In particular, people focus on two issues: (1) whether
they believe that their concerns were adequately considered, and (2)
whether authorities made decisions consistent with public values.
The issue of consideration is central to trust. When authorities ex-
ercise their discretion in making decisions, the public does not know
what facts were considered, what arguments were made, or what val-
ues were scrutinized. People must infer whether authorities are sin-
57. Tyler, supra note 8, at 156-57; see Tom R. Tyler, Procedural justice, Legitimacy, and the
Effective Rule of Law, in 30 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 283-357 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2003); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: Whatdo Majority and Minor-
ity Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Authorities?, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 215, 215-35
(2001).
58. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975).
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cerely trying to do what is right for the people in the community.59 Of
course, it helps people make such an inference if authorities explain
their decisions, detailing how they considered people in the communi-
ty. Hence, explanation promotes trust. It is important to note that this
analysis does not suggest that people should not trust political or legal
authorities. Rather, it argues that those authorities cannot assume that
people will give them credit for having good will and being concerned
about, and responsive to, public concerns. Hence, in addition to making
appropriate decisions, decision makers need to provide the community
with information about how the decisions were made, so that trust is
created and people defer to their decisions. In an era of low trust and
confidence in national institutions, authorities cannot take public ac-
ceptance for granted. They must make an effort to explain how their
efforts address public concerns.
The second issue found to matter is the consistency of decisions
with public values. The fact that this issue emerges as distinct from
making decisions based upon the law highlights the reality that the
public does not view the law as a simple reflection of public values.
Again, this does not mean that the decisions made are not such a re-
flection and are necessarily inconsistent with public views.6o Rather, it
suggests the need to justify decisions through reference to public val-
ues. As Kahan argues, decisions need to communicate respect for those
values, and it is important that the public believes the actions of au-
thorities are consistent with those values.61
Both of these public concerns are linked to issues that go beyond
the traditional concern that authorities be neutral, factual and con-
sistent in their application of legal rules (i.e. principled). Rather, these
concerns reflect the public's focus on the character and values of the
decision makers, i.e. on their sense that decisions are being made by
people who are concerned about the people over whom they exercise
59. Trust involves two issues. First people lack information. People are seldom in a position
to know what authorities have done. If they indicate that they have explored all sides of the issue
the public is not in a position to know specifically what they did. Similarly, the public may lack
specialized knowledge through which it can evaluate the actions of authorities. For these reasons
authorities need to explain what they have done and why they have done it in ways that can be
understood to the public.
60. The issue of discrepancy between law and public values can be treated as an empirical
issue. See PAUL H. ROBINSON &JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME (1995).
61. Kahan, supra note 1, at 59-66.
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authority (not special interests) and who take account of and respect
public values (not just their own ideology).62
To the extent that authorities, legal or political, value public defer-
ence to their decisions, they are more likely to achieve that goal if they
address these public concerns when making decisions. And, as has
been noted, the ability to gain public deference is central to the effec-
tiveness of legal and political authorities, suggesting that dealing with
public concerns when accounting for decisions is advantageous to both
Congress and the Supreme Court.
62. Tom R. Tyler & E. Ailan Lind, A Relational Model ofAuthority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES IN




Table 1. Factors shaping willingness to defer to decisions.
Willingness to defer to
the decision
Principled decision making - 0.12*
Consideration of concerns - 0.35***
Respect for values - 0.18**
Favorability of the outcome 0.60*** 0.35***
Supreme Court/Congress -.13* -0.06
Fairness/unfairness frame 0.06 0.05
Moral/economic issue -.08 -.05




Total adjusted R.-sq. 39% 66%
Table 2. Outcome favorability and deference to decisions.




Principled decision making 0.12 0.17
Consideration of concerns 0.52*** 0.32***
Respect for values 0.12 0.29***
Total adjusted R.-sq. 51% 42%
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Table 3. Issue involved and deference to decisions.
Moral Economic
Low High Low High
Principled decision making 0.22 0.04 0.12 0.02
Consideration of concerns 0.36* 0.39*** 0.29* 0.39**
Respect for values -.04 0.35*** 0.35* 0.19
Favorable/unfavorable de- 0.46*** 0.19* 0.25** 0.39***
cision 
Adjusted R.-sq. 60% 78% 60% 59%
Table 4. Authority, fairness/unfairness frame and deference to deci-
sions.
Willingness to defer to decision
Supreme Court Congress
Justice Injustice Justice Injustice
frame frame frame frame
Principled decision mak- 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.26**
ing
Consideration of con- 0.41*** 0.76*** 0.38** 0.06
cerns
Respect for values 0.04 0.25 0.30* 0.45***
Favorable/unfavorable 0.52*** 0.27*** 0.23** 0.34***
outcome
173% 58% 67% 75%
Willingness to defer to seiin
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